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Abstrat
Network oordinate systems allow for eient onstrution of large-sale distributed
systems on the Internet. Coordinates provide loality information in a ompat way,
without requiring eah node to ontat every potential neighbor; distanes between
two nodes' oordinates represent estimates of the network lateny between them.
Past work on network oordinates has assumed that all nodes in the system behave
orretly. The tehniques in these systems do not behave well when nodes are Byzan-
tine. These Byzantine failures, wherein a faulty node an behave arbitrarily, an make
the oordinate-based distane estimates meaningless. For example, a Byzantine node
an delay responding to some other node, thus distorting that node's omputation of
its own loation.
We present a network oordinate system based on landmarks, referene nodes that
are used for measurements, some of whih may be Byzantine faulty. It sales linearly
in the number of lients omputing their oordinates and does not require exessive
network tra to allow lients to do so. Our results show that our system is able to
ompute aurate oordinates even when some landmarks are exhibiting Byzantine
faults.
Thesis Supervisor: Barbara Liskov
Title: Ford Professor of Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introdution
1.1 Motivation
Nodes in a system distributed aross the Internet have no inherent measure of their
proximity to eah other, but by ommuniating with nearby nodes, they may be able
to redue ommuniation osts. Assuming bandwidth does not represent a bottlenek,
nodes an atively ping other nodes to determine the latenies or round-trip times
to other nodes; however, doing so for thousands of nodes an be ostly and may
outweigh any derived benet. Network oordinates are a ompat representation of
this proximity information that an avoid suh osts.
Network oordinates are an embedding of nodes into a metri spae, with the
distane between nodes in the spae representing the round-trip time between them.
Typially, a node will make some small number of measurements to other nodes in
order to determine its own oordinates. When all the nodes in the system behave
orretly, the resulting oordinates an predit network latenies aurately [14, 31℄.
To be useful, oordinates for a node must have a low error, dened as the dierene
between the atual and predited round-trip times. However, things an go badly if
nodes in the system are trying to ompromise its eetiveness. Attakers an try
to worsen the error for a orretly behaving node by distorting measurements, lying
about their own oordinates, or ausing network delays. For example, in Vivaldi
[6℄, a deentralized oordinate system, even with only 10% of nodes in the system
11
maliiously olluding to disrupt the oordinates, the median average error an more
than double [13℄.
1.2 Our ontributions
The main problem our design addresses is that of faulty landmarks, the nodes to
whih lients make measurements to ompute their own oordinates. We present a
new system that allows orretly behaving lients to ompute aurate oordinates
even if some of their measurements are faultythe measured round-trip times may
be inaurate or the landmarks may never respond.
Our system protets against a powerful Byzantine adversary that an ontrol
a fration of the nodes in the system and oordinate them to behave arbitrarily.
Additionally, our oordinate system is pratial: oordinates are ompat, they an
be eiently omputed by a node from its measurements to a set of landmarks, they
are easily translated into preditions for network latenies, and very little bandwidth
overhead is used for measurement.
Results from our simulations show that even with measurements from Byzantine
faulty landmarks, our oordinate system provides lients with oordinates that are
nearly as aurate for prediting network latenies as they would have been had there
not been faults.
1.3 Thesis outline
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 outlines the basi problems this thesis addresses and the design deisions
we made.
Chapter 3 provides denitions and groundwork for our system.
Chapter 4 explains the protool our system uses to ompute oordinates.
Chapter 5 desribes our implementation, a simulation based on atual network
measurements, and our results.
12
Chapter 6 surveys prior researh in network oordinate systems, inluding previous
approahes to mitigating error.
Finally, Chapter 7 onludes with our observations and diretions for future work.
13
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Chapter 2
Approah
2.1 Design onsiderations
2.1.1 Abstrat model
The abstrat model of a network oordinate system onsists of nodes in the network
and the pairwise round-trip times, or distanes, between them. It ignores heuristi
information, suh as IP prexes, that might provide hints about whih nodes are
proximate to eah other. Syntheti oordinates, embedding the nodes into a oor-
dinate spae, are then omputed from some measurements of the round-trip times,
so that the distane between nodes is a predition of the orresponding round-trip
lateny; oordinates are hosen to minimize some measure of error. The state of the
network at any given time reets the round-trip times measured at that time. Most
previous work in the area of network oordinates [6, 32, 25, 21, 22, 29, 38, 34, 30℄
follows this model.
In network oordinate systems, a lient node may join and need to ompute its
oordinates, or it may need to maintain them to be aurate over time. In the abstrat
model, to arry out this task, a lient uses measurements of the round-trip times to
some subset of the nodes in the system, referred to as its neighbors, and omputes
(adjustments to) its own oordinates relative to the oordinates of its neighbors. If
every node uses the same set of neighbors, this set is alled the landmarks and the
15
system is said to be a landmark system. Otherwise, it is onsidered a deentralized
system.
Some systems, suh as Vivaldi [6℄, also use auxiliary information about the es-
timated error in oordinates, so that aurate oordinates inuene inaurate ones
more than vie versa.
The oordinates, measurements, and other information must be aurate in order
for nodes to aurately ompute oordinates and gain useful information about the
proximity of other nodes but are easily distorted by an adversary trying to make
the system less useful. We designed our system to protet against as powerful an
adversary as possible, for maximal generality. For the reasons desribed in the next
setion, we use a landmark-based approah rather than a deentralized approah to
omputing network oordinates.
2.1.2 Byzantine adversary
The adversarial model we assume is based on Byzantine faults. A node experiening
a Byzantine fault an behave arbitrarily [4℄it may stop responding, send spurious
messages, delay messages, and so on. A Byzantine faulty node an atively try to
ompromise the orretness of the system.
We assume a general, powerful Byzantine adversary that an oordinate all of
the faulty mahines in the network to do its bidding. Additionally, the Byzantine
adversary may introdue network delays for a bounded period of time and manipulate
the routing of pakets to distort distane both positively and negatively.
2.1.3 Faults
How an a Byzantine adversary attak orretly behaving nodes in the system? It
an do so prinipally by forging information given to other nodes or manipulating the
measurements other nodes make to maliious nodes.
If a neighbor is faulty, it annot be relied upon to respond with its own oordinates
or auxiliary information orretly. It is easy for a maliious node to lie about its own
16
AB C
D
D′
E
Figure 2-1: The entral node makes measurements to nodes A through E. A behaves
orretly. B does not respond. C delays messages, inreasing the measured RTT. D
has messages rerouted to D′, dereasing the measured RTT. E responds orretly but
is aeted by network delay.
state in response to requests that ask for it. And unfortunately, a protool to verify a
neighbor's oordinates using the neighbor's neighbors an be prohibitively expensive,
espeially if that neighbor is also updating its own oordinates and annot be expeted
to have the same oordinates from measurement to measurement.
Furthermore, a neighbor will always be able to distort measurements made to
it. Consider the measured round-trip time to be the elapsed time between a node
sending a message to its neighbor and its reeiving a response. Figure 2-1 illustrates
the possible adversarial behavior:
(B) The measured times an go to innity if message responses are dropped, as
responses never arrive.
(C) The measured times an inrease arbitrarily if message responses are intention-
ally delayed.
(D) The measured times an inrease or even derease if messages are interepted
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and rerouted to a loser olluding mahine. This last, ounter-intuitive senario
is further explained below.
Puppeteer
Consider a maliious node operated by an adversary that also ontrols routing for
some subnetwork ontaining it. This node an share its redentials with other ma-
hines in this subnetwork, allowing them to impersonate it. The border routers
of this subnetwork an then rediret tra to the losest of these mahines. This
adversary, whih we all a puppeteer, an thus at to derease distanes measured to
this maliious node, even when the node's oordinates are aurate and it does not
misrepresent its own oordinates. With suiently many puppets and enough ontrol
over how pakets are routed, the distane may be dereased arbitrarily.
To our knowledge, this adversary has not been previously examined in the liter-
ature. For example, Kaafar et al. assumed an attaker that only inreases measured
times [13℄, and PIC assumed an adversary ould derease distanes only down to the
distane to the nearest maliious node [5℄.
Network delays
We assume the attaker is able to introdue persistent network delays on some links
between a node and some neighbors (suh as E in Figure 2-1), even if the neighbors are
behaving orretly. Measurements to these neighbors thus will be inonsistent with
the original network round-trip times. However, we believe it is reasonable to expet
network damage to be repaired eventually, so that delays annot persist forever. We
address the problem of network delays in an extension to our work by adapting over
time in response to new measurements, as desribed in 4.4.1.
2.1.4 Landmarks
It is lear that a Byzantine adversary able to misrepresent both the oordinates of
and measurements to nodes it ontrols is muh more dangerous than one that an
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only manipulate one of these piees of data. For this reason, we hose our system to
be a landmark system, in whih lient measurements are made only to a xed set of
landmark nodes with published, stable oordinates: landmarks annot misrepresent
their own oordinates and do not update them.
Any distributed system an be set up to use landmarks. Sine landmarks are
only in infrequent ommuniation with all the lients in the system, they require only
a small amount of additional infrastruture. Ratnasamy et al. [26℄ observe that a
single landmark may even be repliated aross multiple mahines in one data enter.
Geometri requirements on the positions of the landmarks are examined in setion
3.2.3.
2.2 Goals
Our system was designed to ahieve ertain properties, some of whih are largely
dened by the role of a network oordinate system. These properties, as we formulate
them, are:
Auray: Our system should provide oordinates that predit network round-trip
times well.
Fault tolerane: Our system should provide reasonably aurate oordinates to
honest lients even if some landmarks are Byzantine faulty or network delays
ause inaurate measurements. Our oordinates should be aurate even when
all faulty nodes in the system an ollude.
Pratiality: Clients must be able to ompute their own oordinates in a reasonable
amount of time. Landmarks should not have intensive omputational demands
plaed on them.
Eieny: Sine the purpose of network oordinates is to redue the amount of
ommuniations overhead neessary to determine the proximity of other nodes
in the network, our system should not impose exessive ommuniation burdens.
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Salability: For the measurement overhead to grow linearly with the number of
lients in the system, eah lient should ommuniate with only a onstant
number of nodesthe landmarks.
Certiability: Our oordinates an be made self-ertifying, so that other nodes an
verify a lient's oordinates.
20
Chapter 3
Requirements
In this hapter, we present the basi assumptions and groundwork for our network
oordinates system.
3.1 Denitions
We all lients the nodes that join the system and ompute their own oordinates
from measurements made to the landmarks.
The system parameter f , known to all nodes in the system, speies how many
faulty landmarks are tolerated. In addition to the L landmarks that are required to
ompute aurate oordinates even if none of them are faulty, to tolerate f faults we
inlude an additional 2f landmarks. We desribe these parameters in more detail
below.
3.1.1 Base number of landmarks
Suppose that no landmarks are faulty. While in theory, in a d-dimensional spae, only
d+1 landmarks are required to aurately triangulate oordinates, due to the inherent
embedding distortion, more are usually needed for a reasonable level of auray. We
all L the base number of requisite landmarks.
Past work has studied the number of landmarks without settling on a denitive
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number for L. Ratnasamy et al. [26℄ found that 8 to 12 landmarks are suient
in a low-dimensional spae. Dabek et al. [6℄ found that the auray of GNP [21℄,
a landmark-based oordinate system, did not signiantly inrease beyond 16 land-
marks, although the authors of GNP used 19 in their experiments. Tang and Crovella
[32℄ used 11 and 12 landmarks for some other datasets, aording to what was avail-
able.
3.1.2 Metri spae
The authors of Vivaldi [6℄ studied the eets of hoosing dierent metri spaes for
the oordinate embedding. One kind of spae, a 2-dimensional Eulidean spae to-
gether with a height vetor representing the distane to the network ore that most
paths to a node would have to traverse, was found to be more eetive than either a
Eulidean spae in higher dimensions or a spherial spae. Later work by Ledlie et
al. [15℄ onrmed that 2-D spaes with height vetor were more eetive than higher-
dimensional Eulidean spaes for representing the topology of the Internet on several
data sets.
Following Vivaldi's results, we hose to use a 2-D Eulidean spae with height
vetors for our implementation. A point in the spae is given as x = (x, y, h), with
the third oordinate representing the height (h ≥ 0). The preise denition of the
distane metri is as follows:
d
(
(x1, y1, h1), (x2, y2, h2)
)
=
√
(x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2 + h1 + h2
It is lear that this denition satises the metri spae axioms of symmetry and
the triangle inequality [27℄. Although the distane from a node to itself d(x,x) is
not 0 in general, this detail has no eet in pratie beause a node never needs to
measure the round-trip time to itself.
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3.1.3 Byzantine fault tolerane
Sine there is no way to determine when a landmark is Byzantine faulty, as it may
behave arbitrarily, when we ompute oordinates, we have no a priori way to deide
whih measurements are the results of faults and should be exluded from the om-
putation. Our approah will be to have the non-faulty landmarks outweigh the faulty
ones.
Intuitively, beause in a d-dimensional spae, d measurements are insuient to
loate a single point, the faulty landmarks may be able to agree in a region of the
oordinate spae where several honest landmarks also agree in hopes of ausing a
lient to hoose bad oordinates there. So f additional honest landmarks may be
needed to agree on the orret oordinate, and we suppose that L are neessary for
aurate oordinates in any ase. Thus, we hoose 2f+L for the number of landmarks
used to tolerate f faults. While our hoie of 2f +L landmarks appears to sue, in
theory, it may also be possible to have fewer landmarks beyond the f .
3.2 Landmark oordinates
3.2.1 Auray
The oordinates in our system are bootstrapped by the landmarks' published o-
ordinates. We assume that the landmarks have aurate, unhanging oordinates.
Coordinates that never hange are a reasonable simplied model, sine we do not
expet network topologies to hange frequently.
However, if topologies do hange over long periods of time, xed oordinates,
suh as those of the landmarks, will not remain aurate, and neither will the lient
oordinates that were omputed with them as referene points. However, this problem
is orthogonal to that of omputing aurate lient oordinates for honest lients, the
fous of our work, so we do not onsider it here.
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3.2.2 Publiation
A lient joining the system must have some mehanism to disover the landmarks'
published oordinates. Our system uses the idea of a diretory servie from Tor
[8℄. We assume that the landmarks publish their IP addresses and oordinates in the
diretory, and that it is easily aessible to lients. The diretory ontains a ertiate
authority's publi key, whih the lient an use to verify the landmarks' publi keys
in order to prevent a man-in-the-middle attak. We assume the diretory is not faulty
and always has available the list of oordinates and IP addresses of all the landmarks,
signed by the ertiate authority. (See setion 3.3 for the ryptographi assumptions
we require.)
The diretory provides a trusted view of the landmarks in the system to lients. It
prevents landmarks that later beome faulty from reneging on their originally hosen,
orret oordinates.
A diretory an represent a single point of failure and an beome a bottlenek.
The former problem an be solved using repliationfor example, by using PBFT
[4℄. The latter is not problemati in our system beause we have only very limited
bandwidth demands on the diretory. Eah lient needs only to retrieve the land-
marks' oordinates and one publi key, whih even for hundreds of landmarks should
not take up more than a few kilobytes. Alternative approahes to disovering the net-
work, suh as asking landmarks for a list of the other landmarks in the system, an
ooad some of the work from the diretory, but the diretory stills needs to provide
the ertiate authority's publi key.
3.2.3 Distribution
The auray of a landmark-based oordinate system depends on the relative position
of the landmarks in the oordinate spae. Two landmarks that are too lose to one
another may not provide as muh disriminating information as they would if they
had greatly diering paths aross the Internet to lients. Tang and Crovella [33℄
showed that well-hosen landmarks an signiantly redue the number of landmarks
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needed for the same level of error. Some other work onsiders [5, 16, 39℄ how landmark
seletion dierently aets the auray of prediting short and long distanes.
We assume that our landmarks an be hosen to be distributed aross data enters
that are separated geographially and are pre-seleted out-of-band by the system
operators to be well-distributed.
3.3 Cryptography
Our system requires a basi level of authentiity. A landmark signs the measurement
messages it sends, and the publi keys of the landmarks are all signed by a ertiate
authority whose publi key is available from the diretory servie. All signatures are
assumed to be existentially unforgeable [10℄.
We also inlude nones in all measurement messages to prevent replay attaks or
spoofed replies from being able to aet round-trip times. Some systems [5℄ assume
that nones are suient to guarantee the authentiity of message responses from
landmarks, but we note the possibility of intermediate routers under the Byzantine
attaker's ontrol that ould read the none.
Our sheme uses publi key ryptography, beause the ommuniations are so
infrequent that the ost of publi key ryptography is not too great. To set up a
shared key using Die-Hellman key exhange [7℄ would require more round-trips and
additional messages, and the landmarks would have an additional resoure burden of
at least temporarily storing a seret key for every lient.
We assume our ryptographi primitives are unbreakable, treating them as a blak
box. We do not speify any partiular ryptographi sheme to be used, so long as it
meets our requirements.
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Chapter 4
Protool for Computing Coordinates
This setion desribes the protool for a lient to ompute its oordinates from srath.
Our system begins with established landmark oordinates. Clients joining the system
ompute their oordinates from measurements to the landmarks. However, beause
some landmarks are faulty, we would like to prevent measurements to them from
distorting our omputed oordinates; thus, we attempt to exlude responses from
faulty landmarks.
Eah lient an be onsidered in isolation, sine its ommuniations are only with
the landmarks. There are two phases in this protool: First, the lient makes mea-
surements to all of the landmarks. Then, one it has these measurements, it runs a
omputation to nd its oordinates, eventually disarding some of the measurements.
To deouple the measurements from the omputation step, we introdue an ab-
stration, the estimate, representing a lient's view over time of the round-trip lateny
to a landmark. The omputation step runs atop the estimate abstration. Sine we
assume that network latenies return to normal eventually, in the average ase we
will have an estimate for all landmarks.
The system we implemented is a simpliation that does not use estimates gleaned
from many measurements over time, but instead a single measurement is used as the
estimate. This simpliation has the same properties exept that it does not handle
network delays, as introdued in setion 2.1.3; instead, it assumes that nodes aeted
by persistent delay are never heard from and thus faulty. It reets the lient's initial
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state upon joining, when it does not have prior histories for any landmarks and may
be unable to ompute its oordinates aurately if it is aeted by these network
faults.
4.1 Initialization
The lient rst obtains the list of landmarks and the ertiate authority's key from
the diretory servie, and it veries the list's auray. Then it begins to measure
the round-trip times to the landmarks, using the landmark IP addresses from the
diretory. The landmark oordinates from the diretory are used later, in the om-
putation.
4.2 Measurement Protool
A lient initiates a measurement to a landmark A by sending a ping message ontain-
ing the lient's none, nonce1, to A. Upon reeiving suh a message, A responds with
a pong message ontaining nonce1. This message is signed by A to prevent spoong
by an adversarial network. When the lient reeives the pong, it veries that the
message ame from A and takes the elapsed time sine sending the ping message as
the measured round-trip time. In our simplied system, this measurement is taken
diretly as the estimate that is used in the omputation.
While an honest landmark will reply to the lient immediately, faulty landmarks
may aet the measurements in a number of ways, as desribed in setion 2.1.3.
Though landmarks annot lie about their oordinates, they an distort measurements
both positively and negatively.
Some faulty nodes may fail and never respond to measurements, so we also im-
plement a timeout of approximately 800 milliseonds for eah measurement. We
assume that any latenies longer than this timeout do not orrespond to aurate
measurements and disard them.
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Compute-Coordinates(initial -coords, estimates)
1 x← Gradient-Desent(initial -coords, estimates)
2 ℓ← | estimates |
3 while ℓ > f + L
4 do estimates. remove(Estimate-with-Worst-Error(estimates))
5 ℓ← ℓ− 1
6 x← Gradient-Desent(x, estimates)
7 return x
Figure 4-1: Pseudoode for the omputation. An estimate is removed and the oor-
dinates are reomputed, iteratively, until f + L remain.
4.3 Computation
After obtaining estimates, of whih the lient will have up to 2f + L, and having
learned the landmarks' published oordinates from the diretory, the lient omputes
its own oordinates. Our protool for omputing landmark-based oordinates removes
up to f nodes from the omputation inrementally.
There are two issues to onsider:
1. Given a set of estimates to landmarks, how are oordinates hosen to minimize
the error?
2. Whih landmarks' estimates should be inluded in the omputation of the
lient's oordinates?
These aspets of the omputation are referred to as the triangulation for seleting
oordinates and the strategy for seleting landmarks to use, respetively. We hose
to use a gradient desent for the triangulation step; it is run initially to inlude all
available estimates. Our strategy is to iteratively remove the estimate with the worst
error from the triangulation and reompute until only f + L landmark estimates
remain. Figure 4-1 shows a pseudoode desription of our algorithm.
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4.3.1 Error funtion
Sine the oordinate system is used to predit round-trip times between nodes, we
dene the error in eah estimate as the inauray between the oordinate distane,
or the predited round-trip time, and the estimate, or the measured round-trip time.
Let pi be the measured round-trip ping time from the lient to landmark i, whose
oordinates are xi = (xi, yi, hi) in the 2-D with height metri spae. For the individual
errors, we use the spring potential energy error funtion as dened in Vivaldi [6℄,
(d(x,xi)− pi)
2
.
The total error funtion is dened to be the average of the errors in the estimate
to eah landmark. Thus, the average error at a point x = (x, y, h) is the average of
the spring potential energies,
1
n
∑
i∈landmarks
(d(x,xi)− pi)
2 ,
where n is the number of landmarks in the omputation. In a 2-dimensional with
height metri spae, this expression beomes
1
n
∑
i∈landmarks
(√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + h+ hi − pi
)2
.
4.3.2 Triangulation
In the triangulation step, a set of estimates to landmarks and a starting point in the
oordinate spae is given as the input, and the output is a point in the oordinate
spae that minimizes the error funtion for those landmarks. In this step, a lient nds
the oordinates x = (x, y, h) that minimize the energy funtion. The starting point
an be initially seleted randomly or xed at the origin; for subsequent triangulation
steps, the triangulation an begin from the point omputed by the previous one.
The problem of omputing the oordinates that minimize some error funtion
determined by the estimates falls into the domain of unonstrained nonlinear pro-
gramming, a well-studied numerial problem in the literature [1, 35℄. The nonlinear
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optimization an be solved using a numerial method suh as gradient desent, the
Nelder-Meade simplex algorithm (whih requires a starting simplex of n + 1 points
in an n-dimensional spae), or simulated annealing [35℄. These tehniques will nd a
loal minimum, not neessarily a global minimum, of a potential funtion.
We hose to use a gradient desent to nd the oordinates in the triangulation
step. For gradient desent, we must nd the gradient of the error funtion; sine the
energy funtion orresponds to spring potential energy, by Hooke's law, the fore
should orrespond to the spring fore.
While a gradient desent may be implemented to travel along the diretion of the
gradient to a one-dimensional minimum on that line [35℄, we sarie this level of
exatness for eieny and avoid solving this one-dimensional minimization problem.
Our step size in the gradient desent is hosen to be proportional to the magnitude of
the gradient of the error funtion. We nd that the saling of 1/n from the averaging
works well, and our experiments do not show any onvergene failures, indiating that
our gradient desent is nding a loal minimum as desired.
4.3.3 Strategy
Sine we would like to ompute aurate oordinates, even when up to f landmarks
are faulty, we will ompute oordinates from the estimates to only f + L landmarks.
Thus, we remove landmarks from the triangulation omputation until only f + L
remain. Up to f landmarks will be removedfewer than f if some landmarks are
never heard from and thus the lient has no estimate for them. Equivalently, we an
say that exatly f will not be inluded in the nal round of omputation, and those
landmarks that are never heard from were removed to begin with.
In the worst ase, when all 2f +L landmarks respond, nding the subset of f +L
that gives the absolute lowest error requires examining all
(
2f+L
f
)
= O
(
(2f + L)f
)
possible subsets, an exponentially large number (beause L is large, at least 10 or so).
Hene, it is impratial for even small values of f , suh as 4, beause the gradient
desent in the triangulation is not a heap omputation. Note that there is also
no guarantee that this optimal subset does not inlude faulty landmarks. (Sine
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we do not evaluate oordinates' auray based on faulty landmarks, the optimal
oordinates for the lient should be omputed just with the estimates from the f +L
honest landmarks, but sine the lient has no way of knowing whih landmarks are
faulty, the exponential-time strategy is the best it an hope to do.)
Therefore, a lient annot pratially nd the absolute minimum over all possible
subsets of f + L landmarks. A lient instead tries to nd an appropriate subset of
landmarks that gives a low average error. To do so, we use intermediate triangulation
steps on ertain larger subsets.
We use the following approximation. Given the oordinates omputed from an
triangulation step, onsider the average error to eah landmark. That landmark
that ontributes the most error is the one to be removed from the triangulation to
derease the average error by the most, if the resulting oordinates are the same.
However, the resulting oordinates should be dierent, sine removing a landmark
will hange the set of landmarks and thus the error funtion. To justify removing this
landmark with the worst error, the approximation we use is that the new oordinates
are approximately the old oordinates.
We only remove one landmark at a time from the omputation beause the disrep-
any between new error funtion and the old error funtion grows with the number
of landmarks' estimates removed from the error funtion. Our strategy thus takes at
most f + 1 rounds of the triangulation to ompute the nal oordinates.
Other strategies
We also studied an alternative strategy, using O
(
(L + f)f
)
rounds of triangulation.
Again we iteratively remove one landmark's estimate from the triangulation at a
time, but we selet that estimate dierently. If we have n estimates left, then for eah
estimate, we tentatively remove it, leaving n − 1 on whih to run the triangulation,
and see what the resulting error is. The one that is atually removed is the one whose
removal gave the lowest resulting error.
Although this alternative strategy is provably better when f = 1, as it does
evaluate all possible subsets of size f + L and hoose the best one, we found that
32
it does not perform as well for larger values of f . We onjeture that it may be
beause, given a hoie between a region of oordinate spae agreed on by mainly
honest landmarks and another region in aordane with mainly faulty landmarks, it
is easier for the oordinate to wander toward one or the other, and hene to beome
lost in the faulty spae.
Our strategy is thus a more pratial approah to omputing the oordinates that
minimize the average error.
4.4 Extensions
4.4.1 Estimate abstration
As an extension to our system, to handle network faults, we dispense with the simpli-
ation that measurements are identied with estimates. Instead, eah lient main-
tains, for eah landmark, its urrent estimate of the round-trip time to that landmark.
The estimates are undened before any measurements take plae. Estimates are up-
dated by measurements to the landmarks and are used by the oordinate omputation.
There are two reasons to dene this abstration. First, there may be hanges to
the network topology over time, inluding persistent network delays. Seond, jitter,
the variane in network round-trip times due to queueing delays at routers, should
not unduly aet how oordinates are omputed. Thus, the urrent estimate should
be able to adapt over time to reet a new underlying round-trip time but should
also inlude elements of a low-pass lter.
Our system aggregates measurements over time to form estimates using an expo-
nential weighted moving average aording to
estimatei+1 = (1− α) · estimatei +α ·measurement i (4.1)
for some small fration α. This method is similar to the preditors used in other sys-
tems; for example, TCP's retransmission timer uses an exponential weighted moving
average to estimate a link's round-trip time [24℄.
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4.4.2 Certiability and faulty lients
While our system addresses the problem of preventing faulty landmarks from de-
grading lients' omputed oordinates, it is also worth asking how to prevent lients
from hoosing arbitrary oordinates. After all, in a loality-aware overlay network,
maliious lients inserting themselves into the oordinate spae may make the ost
of ommuniation more expensive for an appliation running atop the oordinates
by triking honest nodes, lose to the titious oordinates in the oordinate spae,
into routing through them while they are in atuality far away, thereby defeating the
original purpose of the oordinates.
Our oordinates an be made self-ertifying with a small amount of additional
ommuniation that allows the landmarks to generate signed estimates for the lients
to ollet. The landmarks also maintain estimates to the lients. These self-ertifying
oordinates an be veried independently by any other node in the system.
To make measurements self-ertifying, we modify the protool as follows. Land-
marks also inlude a landmark none, nonce2, in their pong messages. One a lient
has an estimate, it an send a guess mesage to the landmark with nonce2 and its
urrent estimate, whih is derived from its previous estimate and the new measure-
ment. The landmark veries that the lient's estimate is within some tolerane of its
own. If it is, it replies with a hek message in whih it signs the lient's estimate (it
must use publi key ryptography here in order for other nodes to be able to verify
the oordinates). The lient then ollets the signed estimates. The total number of
messages is doubled from our original protool.
If the omputation of oordinates from the set of estimates is deterministi, then
any node an ompute the same set of oordinates from these signed estimates, whih
sue to ertify the oordinates (though in pratie the ertiate should onsist
of both the set of estimates and the derived oordinates). Elements of randomness
an be made deterministi by initializing from the same random seed, whih an be
derived from the lient's ID. Thus, verifying a lient's self-ertifying oordinates an
be done by heking the validity of the landmarks' signatures on the estimates and
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re-running the omputation based on those estimates.
For ertiable oordinates, the additional resoure burdens on the landmarks are
in storage and bandwidththe urrent estimate, a single number, is stored for every
lient, and approximately twie as muh network bandwidth is used. Either an serve
to limit the number of lients our system an support.
Unfortunately, faulty lients an be hoosy about whih estimates they use in
their omputation, espeially in ollusion with faulty landmarks. They an do so by
laiming that measurements to a ertain subset of the landmarks had been dropped,
so that their oordinates were omputed with only the remaining. Exatly how muh
a faulty lient an manipulate its own oordinates within these boundaries is a subjet
for future work.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
To establish the feasibility of our approah to omputing oordinates and determine
how aurate we were in the presene of Byzantine faults, we implemented a sim-
ulation of our system. We found that our system's error in the presene of faulty
landmarks was omparable to the error for oordinates omputed when no landmarks
were faulty. These results show that our system's approah is valid. In this hapter,
we disuss our experimental setup, results, and interpretations thereof.
5.1 Simulation
Our simulation of our system is written in Java and onsists of 1162 lines of ode. It
uses an event-driven simulation to represent the delivery of messages in the steps of
this protool and our own ode for the gradient desent in the triangulation step.
Our simulation inludes the modeling of the extra ommuniations and omputa-
tions needed to handle Byzantine lients, but we have not yet implemented a model
for the faulty lient that tries to manipulate its own oordinates. As mentioned in
setion 4.4.2, a faulty lient may seletively ignore some of the measurements it re-
eives in order to ompute its oordinates. The simulation implements the simplied
protool in hapter 4 that does not deal with estimates over time.
We used our simulation framework to study several adversarial models and eval-
uate our system's eetiveness.
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5.1.1 King data
To run our simulation on data onsisting of atual Internet latenies, we used the
King dataset from the P2PSim projet [9℄, ontaining 1740 DNS servers and the
atual measured round-trip times between them. The King method for olleting the
pairwise round-trip times was to make a reursive query to server A through server
B, and then make a query diretly to server B, and ompute the dierene between
the round-trip times, as desribed in [11℄.
We ran our system on a sample of 100 nodes seleted from the King dataset.
Sine a small but nonzero fration of the pairs of nodes in the King dataset do not
have measurements between them, we seleted our subset suh that all
(
100
2
)
pairwise
measurements were present.
Vivaldi [6℄ was run on the 1740 nodes to generate the initial oordinates for land-
marks to be used in simulations. This is not neessarily the best approahit would
perhaps be more valid to generate the oordinates by omputing network oordinates
on only the nodes in our sample or only the landmarks in an experimentbut it
provides a reasonable approximation.
5.1.2 Adversary
The Byzantine adversary we hose for this simulation is quite powerful. We assume it
has knowledge of all the inter-node round-trip times and that a maliious landmark is
able to inrease or derease measured round-trip times; this atually serves to simplify
our model beause we do not require a lower bound onstraint on the measurement
that a faulty landmark may return.
Beause we did not know a priori what kind of attak on our system would be
most eetive, we experimented with several dierent adversarial behaviors. In eah
adversarial model, the delay is the disrepany between what the orretly measured
round-trip time would be and the round-trip time that the lient sees; delays an be
positive or negative. Every lient is subjet to attak. The adversaries we studied
are ategorized below.
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Constant delay: Maliious landmarks all ause measurements to be delayed by the
same length of time.
Random delay: Maliious landmarks independently randomly hoose a length of
time to delay eah message; the delay is hosen from a random distribution and
an be positive or negative.
Random target: Maliious landmarks independently randomly hoose a target o-
ordinate for eah lient. Then, eah landmark sets the delay so that the lient
sees as its measurement the metri spae distane between its oordinates and
the target.
Colluding target: Maliious landmarks randomly hoose and agree upon a target
oordinate for eah lient, and set the delay similarly to the random target ase.
The latter two kinds of adversaries are motivated by the repulsion attaker
in [13℄; some other attak methods from that and other works [5℄ are not diretly
appliable beause they employ lying about a faulty node's oordinates, whih is not
possible in our landmark system.
5.2 Experimental methodology
Based on the disussion in setion 3.1.1, we hose L = 10. Eah dierent setting
of parameters was run in 200 experiments, eah initialized with dierent random
seeds. In eah experiment, out of the 100 nodes, 2f + L were randomly hosen to be
landmarks and the remainder were lients. We rst ran the simulation with no faulty
landmarks as the ontrol sample, and then with f faulty landmarks hosen randomly
from within the 2f + L, whih we refer to as the experimental sample. The ontrol
sample represents the best oordinates that an be omputed from the landmarks, so
that the hoie of landmarks and the embedding error are ontrolled for, and just the
eet of introduing faulty landmarks and using our protool an be measured.
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5.2.1 Measuring auray
To understand how well our system prevented faulty landmarks from disrupting the
oordinate system, we studied several measures of error. The basis for our evaluation
of our system's auray was the predited and observed round-trip times between
lients and non-faulty landmarks. In the ontext of oordinates and measurements,
these values are dened for a lient-landmark pair as follows.
Consider a lient in an experiment. In the ontrol sample, it omputes its oor-
dinates to be x; in the experimental sample, it omputes its oordinates to be x
′
.
For honest landmark i with oordinates xi, the observed distane is pi, the measured
inter-node round-trip ping time; the ontrol predited distane is d(x,xi), as given
by the metri of the spae; and the experimental predited distane is d(x′,xi).
To determine how muh our experimental omputed lient oordinates deviate
from the oordinates in the ontrol sample, we onsidered our experimental sample's
predited distanes relative to the ontrol sample's predited distanes. This loseness
is given by
|d(x′,xi)− d(x,xi)|
d(x,xi)
,
where x
′
is the lient's oordinate.
The relative error for the preditions, a measure of how aurate they are for pre-
diting the atual round-trip latenies, is given by omparing the predited distane
relative to the measured distane; it is
|d(x,xi)− pi|
pi
for the ontrol sample, and
|d(x′,xi)− pi|
pi
for the experimental sample.
These loseness and relative error values are aggregated at the lient level. That
is, in eah experiment, eah lient's loseness or relative error was omputed for all
f + L honest landmarks, and the mean of these values was taken to be a data point
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representing that lient:
Closeness:
1
f + L
∑
i∈honest landmarks
|d(x′,xi)− d(x,xi)|
d(x,xi)
(5.1)
Control relative error:
1
f + L
∑
i∈honest landmarks
|d(x,xi)− pi|
pi
(5.2)
Experimental relative error:
1
f + L
∑
i∈honest landmarks
|d(x′,xi)− pi|
pi
(5.3)
Note that we measure auray using all the honest landmarks, but these might not
be the same set of landmarks used to ompute the oordinates.
Finally, data for all the lients aross all experiments with the same set of param-
eters is onsidered together.
5.3 Adversary type
In this setion, we vary the type of adversary and x the other parameters. Sine the
adversary has no eet on the ontrol sample, the result is that the ontrol sample is
idential aross adversaries. Hene, we ompare just the experimental relative errors
to see whih adversary is most eetive at inreasing them.
We rst onsidered the onstant delay adversary, with onstant delays of −25,
−10, 10, 25, 50, and 100 ms added to the round-trip time measurement. Figure 5-1
ompares the experimental relative errors (from formula 5.3) for eah hoie of delay
onstant aross dierent values of f ; the mean, 10th perentile, and 90th perentile
aross all lients in all experiments are plotted for eah hoie of the delay. There are
two onlusions to be drawn: rst, the error is slightly worse for higher values of f ;
seond, the error is worse for higher delays. These numbers appear onsistent with
Kaafar et al.'s observation that an attaker is not as eetive when pulling nodes
toward itself as when pushing them away [13℄.
Next, we ompare all the dierent adversarial behaviors, as shown in gure 5-2.
The random delay adversary hooses delays uniformly between −25 and 75 ms; the
targets for the random and olluding target adversaries are hosen randomly within
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Figure 5-1:
|d(x′,xi)−pi|
pi
for dierent delay values for a onstant delay adversary. The
mean is shown with 10th90th perentile error bars.
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Figure 5-2:
|d(x′,xi)−pi|
pi
for dierent adversary types. The mean is shown with 10th
90th perentile error bars.
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a box in the oordinate spae that bounds all the original oordinates omputed with
Vivaldi. Again, the data shows error inreasing somewhat with f . It is not surprising
that the olluding target adversary an make error worse than the random target
adversary, or, based on the previous omparison, that the random delay adversary
(for our hoie of distribution) is less harmful than the onstant delay adversary for
longer delays.
Based on our data, sine the olluding target adversary seemed to ause the great-
est inrease in error, espeially as f inreased, we onsidered the olluding target
adversary for the remainder of our evaluation.
5.4 Closeness
We analyze how lose the predited distanes in the experimental sample are to the
predited distanes in the ontrol sample. For eah lient, we plot its average lose-
ness (formula 5.1) in gures 5-3 and 5-4 as probability and umulative distribution
funtions respetively. A loseness of 0 indiates that every predited distane with
faulty landmarks is exatly the same as without. Some of a lient's preditions may
beome loser to the observed value, but loseness onsiders them to be deviations
from the original ontrol preditions.
We nd that even for f = 10, at the 90th perentile, the error is quite low90%
of lients have 27% or less average disrepany in their predited distanes from the
ontrol's predited distanes. This result suggests that for the vast majority of lients,
the oordinates omputed in the presene of faulty landmarks give approximately the
same information about the proximity of other nodes as the ase there are no faults. It
is also lear that as f inreases, the distribution of lient loseness extends further out
as the experimental predited distanes approximate the ontrol predited distanes
less well.
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Figure 5-3: Probability distribution of 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loseness.
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5.5 Relative error ratio
To ompare the experimental sample against the ontrol sample, we show in gure
5-5 the mean and 10th and 90th perentiles of the relative error for lients in the
experimental and ontrol ases. As expeted, the ontrol ase remains unhanged as
f inreases, but beyond f = 7 the mean of the relative error over the lients begins
to rise and is signiantly outside the error bars.
For a more preise quantitative evaluation, for eah lient we divided its experi-
mental relative error by its ontrol relative error to get that lient's ratio of average
relative errors,
1
f + L
∑
i∈honest landmarks
|d(x′,xi)− pi|
pi
1
f + L
∑
i∈honest landmarks
|d(x,xi)− pi|
pi
. (5.4)
These ratios of average relative errors are plotted in gures 5-6 and 5-7 as probability
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and umulative distribution funtions respetively. Here, a ratio of 1 indiates that
the lient's experimental oordinates are, on average, just as good at prediting its
round-trip distane to honest landmarks as the ontrol oordinates. A ratio less than
1 indiates the lient's oordinates are even better in the experimental sample than
in the ontrol (this eet is not entirely aounted for by the loseness evaluation).
Our results show that the bulk of lients in the experimental sample have very lose
to the same average relative error ompared to the ontrol. In fat, approximately half
of the lients have an average relative error that atually improves over the ontrol.
Additionally, most of the lients do not have signiantly distorted oordinates. For
f = 2, for example, at the 90th perentile, only 10% of lients were more than 23%
perent worse at prediting round-trip times to the honest landmarks than in the
experimental ase. Similarly, for f = 6, 90% of nodes had less than 36% worse
relative error, and for f = 10, the 90% uto is at 75% worse error.
5.6 Summary
These results suggest that our system provides reasonably aurate oordinates even
when there are f faults, the maximum tolerated in the system. Compared to the ase
when there are no faults, the resulting oordinates generally have a similar oordinate-
spae view of the round-trip distanes, and the average relative error either dereases
or inreases by a small amount for all but a small fration of the lients. However,
our system of 2f + L landmarks does beome less eetive as f inreases.
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Chapter 6
Related work
Although there are ountless works in the literature, some of whih use network
oordinates, that address the general problem of disovering loation information in
a network, only a few address the possibility of maliious nodes in the system and
mitigating their eets on the rest of the system. We desribe some of the relevant
works in this area below.
6.1 Network oordinates and positioning
There are three main kinds of network positioning systems, lassied by their ap-
proah to omputing loation information: landmark-based oordinate systems, de-
entralized oordinate systems, and systems that do not use oordinates.
Landmark systems: GNP [21℄ was a seminal landmark system that showed the
then-surprising possibility of embedding network nodes into a low-dimensional
Eulidean spae with low error. Eah lient in GNP minimizes an error funtion
using a simplex algorithm [20℄ to ompute its oordinates. Virtual Landmarks
[32℄ uses a Lipshitz embedding, in whih the n-dimensional oordinates are
the minimum distane to eah landmark, and then applies prinipal omponent
analysis to redue the dimensionality of the oordinates.
Several systems have a set of global landmarks, but nodes do not have to om-
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muniate with them diretly. NPS [22℄ uses a hierarhial struture and is
based on GNP. In Lighthouse [25℄, eah node omputes its oordinates relative
to some neighbors (that do not have to be the landmarks), then transforms its
loal-basis oordinates into the global basis for the oordinate spae.
Deentralized systems: Vivaldi [6℄ is a frequently studied deentralized oordinate
system that introdued the notion of height vetors; it uses the spring poten-
tial energy funtion as a basis for omputing oordinates. Big-Bang Simulation
[29℄ uses a model of fore elds between points, in whih points attrat or re-
pel to redue error. These two systems model a physial simulation in whih
oordinates hange to minimize the potential funtion. PIC [5℄ showed that
a node's preditions of short distanes and long distanes were more aurate
when the neighbors were hosen to be lose to the node or at random, respe-
tively, and that the best oordinates were omputed from a mix of lose and
random neighbors. PCoord [16℄ uses a similar observation to try to maintain
nearby neighbors in its omputation; nodes use a simplex downhill algorithm
[20℄ to ompute oordinates and the triangle inequality to estimate unmeasured
distanes.
Non-oordinate systems: Meridian [36℄ does not use oordinates but plaes neigh-
bors into onentri rings based on their measured distane; it appears to fous
on the problem of routing in overlay networks. Otant [37℄ is a system for geolo-
ating nodes, rather than plaing them with respet to eah other in a syntheti
oordinate system; the interesting tehnique it uses is to dene regions of er-
tainty based on an error tolerane in eah measurement and thresholding to
nd a region of spae onsistent with suiently many measurements.
iPlane [18℄ and Netvigator [28℄ do not treat the network as a blak box, but
use data about distanes to intermediate routers from traeroute probes. iPlane
attempts to build a strutural model of the network topology; Netvigator pro-
vides a servie to loate nearby landmarks and guesses inter-node latenies by
using the triangle inequality on the two endpoints and any landmark.
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6.2 Attaks
Kaafar et al. [13℄ helped to motivate this thesis by showing the vulnerability of Vivaldi
to maliious nodes in the system. They identied three possible adversarial behaviors,
whih they alled disorder, repulsion, and olluding isolation, and showed that even
with a small perentage of faulty nodes in the system, Vivaldi's auray degraded
dramatially. Zage and Nita-Rotaru [38℄ lassied adversarial behaviors as inating,
deating, or osillating, based on whether they tended to ause nodes to inorretly
move or fail to move in adjusting to measurements. They studied the eets of
dierent adversaries on Vivaldi and ame to similar onlusions.
The adversary in PIC [5℄ is muh more powerful; its behavior is determined by
an optimization problem to be as harmful as possible, and it is assumed to be able
to advertise false oordinates and derease measurements within some limits. The
adversary uses the simplex algorithm [20℄ to solve a multi-dimensional optimization
problem over the oordinates and measurements for every maliious node.
We do not think that a more sophistiated attaker like PIC's would hange the
fundamental design of our system. However, there may be geometri weaknesses
we have not yet disovered that suh an attaker might exploit. Furthermore, some
parameters, suh as the number of landmarks needed to tolerate f faults, may need
to be adjusted to maintain an aeptable level of error.
6.3 Reduing error
Several works apply tehniques for reduing error, often against maliious adversaries,
to onstrut new systems or to seure existing deentralized systems suh as Vivaldi.
6.3.1 Triangle inequality violations
One soure of embedding error enountered in Internet measurements is violations
of the triangle inequality, where for nodes a, b, c, the measured ab lateny plus
the bc lateny is less than the ac lateny. Any suh nodes annot be embedded
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without distortion in a metri spae, whih must satisfy the triangle inequality by
denition [27℄. Yet in many datasets in the literature [34, 6, 32℄, large frations of
the node pairs (a, b) were subjet to a triangle inequality violation, where some node
c existed suh that d(a, c) + d(c, b) < d(a, b). Many suh violations are attributed to
measurement unertainty, but signiant frations (1037% in some data sets [15℄)
had severe violations. Nevertheless, oordinate systems suh as Vivaldi [6℄ are still
able to ompute good oordinates when there are no faults, although a small fration
of predited distanes will be inaurate.
While many triangle inequality violations exist beause of internet routing poliies
[17℄, maliious nodes may also be a soure of these inonsistenies. Some systems
therefore attempt to detet these violations to exlude measurements that violate the
triangle inequality.
Nodes in PIC [5℄ detet triangle inequality violations and iteratively remove neigh-
bors that show the worst violation from their oordinate omputation until the re-
maining error is small.
Wang et al. [34℄ use the idea that measurements that give a high relative er-
ror between the predited and observed distanes are likely to ause severe triangle
inequality violations. Neighbors are ranked based on how likely they are to ause
triangle inequality violations, and the less likely half are kept in the omputation.
Unlike PIC, the authors only onsider the inherent triangle inequality violations in
the spae, not maliious attakers.
6.3.2 Statistial analysis
Several other approahes use statistial analysis of the behavior of nodes' oordinates
and how they hange over time to predit when a measurement is anomalous and
thus more likely to be faulty.
Kaafar et al. [12℄ use Kalman ltering to detet errors that an be introdued by
maliious nodes. As a basis for orret behavior of oordinates over time, nodes use
lter parameters from a nearby trusted node, while trusted nodes only ommuniate
with other trusted nodes. Unfortunately, this approah relies upon an infrastru-
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ture of trusted nodes that are assumed never to be faulty; these nodes may need to
onstitute as muh as 8% of the system if they are hosen randomly [12℄.
Zage and Nita-Rotaru [38℄ use the tehnique of outlier detetion, borrowed from
network intrusion detetion systems. Spatial outliers are neighbors that report dis-
tanes inonsistent with other neighbors, while temporal outliers are neighbors that
are inonsistent over time; outliers beyond a threshold are removed from the oordi-
nate omputation.
Ledlie et al. [15℄ use lateny lters on measurements from the same soure, sim-
ilar to our notion of estimates, and update lters to make oordinates more stable
(rather than aurate). They also use a tehnique to inorporate measurements from
neighbors that may be in only infrequent ommuniation, a useful adaptation for a
system that only inludes passive measurements.
6.3.3 Voting
Veraity [30℄ is a system in whih a node's oordinates are veried by a veriation
set, whose members approve the oordinates by measuring the round-trip time to
the node and heking that it is onsistent with the oordinate spae distane. To
prevent attakers from overrepresenting themselves, a node's veriation set is hosen
deterministially by hashing its IP address and looking up the value in a distributed
hash table [2℄.
Veraity assumes a onstrained-ollusion Byzantine attaker, as introdued in [3℄,
in whih the faulty nodes are divided into small ohorts and only ollude within their
ohort. This assumption makes it muh easier to show the feasibility of voting, as the
faulty nodes are muh less likely to ollude to overwhelm a vote together. However,
sine the authors assume a minimum of 10 distint ohorts, and eah ontains less
than 10% of the nodes, it is a muh weaker adversarial model than the Byzantine
adversary assumed by our work and others [5, 38℄. Another drawbak is that in
order to verify a node's oordinates, one must must ontat its entire veriation set,
requiring an O(logn) DHT lookup for eah of the set members.
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Chapter 7
Conlusion
We designed and implemented a landmark-based network oordinate system that is
able to provide aurate oordinates even when some of the landmarks are Byzantine
faulty. Still, the nal word on fault-tolerant network oordinates is far from being
written.
Ideally, our system should not see auray derease as f inreases. That our ex-
periments show this to be happening indiates that we may not have hosen preisely
the number of landmarks to tolerate f faults. It is oneivable that ould tolerate f
faulty landmarks with fewer than 2f + L landmarks when f is small; onversely, we
may want more than 2f +L landmarks for larger f to minimize the introdued error.
Beause it was randomly determined whih nodes were hosen as landmarks in
experiments, our results ould potentially be stronger if our landmarks were arefully
seleted to be well-distributed, although we attempted to ontrol for this eet with
the ontrol sampleour experiments to ompare the ases with and without faulty
nodes eah used the same seletion of landmarks within our set of nodes. Conversely,
note also that we randomly seleted whih landmarks were faulty. In the future, we
plan to analyze a Byzantine attaker that has suient ontrol to hoose a partiularly
bad set of landmarks to beome faulty.
It is possible that better algorithms and strategies exist for oping with faulty
measurements. One motivation for using gradient desent for the nonlinear program-
ming in the triangulation in setion 4.3.2 was its relative ease of implementation.
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In the future, it may be preferable to use an existing dediated pakage suh as
OpenOpt [23℄ to solve the nonlinear programming problem in the triangulation step.
Merz and Priebe [19℄ also reently suggested a replaement for standard nonlinear
programming algorithms and laimed to perform better on omputing network oor-
dinates. It may also be telling to ompare the error in oordinates omputed with
our estimate-removing strategy against the error from the exponential-time optimal
strategy.
More data about short-term variane in measurements due to eets like network
ongestion may be gleaned by onduting larger-sale experiments on real networks
suh as PlanetLab, though these real-time measurements will have the disadvantage
that it is more diult for faulty landmarks in our experiments to derease measured
distanes on the Internet. We hope that also olleting data on bandwidth usage
may further support the argument for our system's pratiality for deployment on
Internet-sale networks.
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